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The Theory of Institutional Change Revisited. 
The Institutional Dichotomy, Its Dynamic, and Policy Implications 
in a More Formal Analysis 
 
Draft 
 
Wolfram Elsner*) 
 
 
Abstract:  The original institutionalist theory of institutional change as elaborated by Paul D. Bush (1987) in the 
traditions of Veblen, Ayres and J.F. Foster (called here the VAFB-paradigm), provides a most important 
theoretical and empirical device for critical institutional analysis, with its clarification of the value base and of 
different forms and dynamics of value-behavior patterns. Bush’s paper was certainly one of the most important 
ones in Institutionalism. The Theory of Institutional Change pushed Institutionalism to a certain limit by 
elaborating its logical relations and systems that have been underexplored for so long. 
Coming from different ‘galaxies’, established formal approaches and methods, such as system 
dynamics, econometrics, network analysis, graph theory, or game theory—in fact, often applied only bluntly in 
the mainstream—have been interpreted, developed and applied by institutional and evolutionary economists in 
an evolutionary-institutionalist perspective in recent decades. However, a theoretical and methodological gap 
somehow still existed until recently that those practicing institutionalists had to deal with. 
This gap seems to become closed in different areas (such as the Theory of Institutional Change or the 
Social Fabric Matrix Approach) currently. This paper tries to demonstrate that careful proper interpretations 
allow, in a ‘dialectical’ process, to bridge the remaining gap and reveal surprising equivalences and 
complementarities with resulting synergies for the future. The example here is the mutual approximation of the 
VAFB-paradigm and evolutionary-institutionally interpreted game theory, called the EIGT-paradigm here. 
Should such bridge-building be corroborated in the near future, Institutionalism would be enabled to cut 
across traditional and long lasting boundaries with respect to deeper both empirical and logical analysis. This 
might turn out to be a historical project of the extension of Institutionalism’s reach. 
 
 
The particular asymmetry of the logics of instrumental vs. ceremonial warrants explains a general 
dominance of the ceremonial. The forms of change of institutional value-behavior structures derived are (1) 
(reinforced) ‘ceremonial encapsulation’, (2) regressive institutional change and (3) progressive institutional 
change. In the cases (2) and (3), the degree of ceremonial dominance will have to increase (decrease) and the 
system’s ‘permissiveness’ to decrease (increase). 
The conceptualization of institutions, the asymmetric schematization of value-behavior-structures, the 
reason for ceremonial dominance, and the possibility of progressive institutional change will be reconsidered 
and compared in this paper using a game-theoretic perspective, with its basically instrumental comprehension of 
institutions and with the ceremonial warrant comprehensible only as a degeneration of the instrumental. We 
refer to a most simple social dilemma interaction structure and a supergame solution. Surprising equivalences 
and complementarities emerge, with potentials of cross-fertilization. 
An initially instrumental institution is considered to develop (in fact degenerate), together with (1) the 
emergence, or reproduction, of status and power differentials in hierarchical systems, and (2) the striving for 
easy, smooth, and cheap decision-making, or ‘economies of scale’ of decision-making, first into a still 
instrumental norm and eventually into a ceremonial or abstract norm. The latter takes place, when original 
conditions have changed but the institutional structure will not properly adapt because of the two motives of 
status gain and economies of scale of institutionalized decision-making. In a game-theoretical perspective, 
ceremonial dominance and ceremonial encapsulation preventing a new progressive institutional change would 
translate into an insufficient new collective action capacity, due to (1) habituation, (2) an insufficient incentive 
structure and (3) a neglect of the common future. 
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The conclusion of the critical role of policy to initiate, accelerate, and stabilize progressive institutional 
change is shared in the original institutionalist and the game-theoretic perspectives as well. A well-defined 
institutional policy approach, inferable in some detail from the game-theoretic logic, may initiate a lock-out of 
ceremonial encapsulation, through a change of the incentive structure and an increase of the importance and 
awareness of interdependence and a common future. The public agent must be capable of ‘meritorizing’ the 
private-interaction outcomes through a negotiated, participatory social process. Thus, the public agent would 
interact with the interaction system of the private agents in a well-defined way, i.e., ‘institutional policy’ as a 
double interactive policy. In all, large potentials for cross-fertilization of institutionalism and game theory. 
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Introduction 
 
The dynamics of social institutions between instrumental and ceremonial warrant is an 
original-institutionalist core theme. Thorstein Veblen and two of his finest exponents, 
Clarence E. Ayres and his student, J. Fagg Foster, explored the dynamics of institutions 
between the instrumental and ceremonial. The evolutionary-institutionalist ‘state of the art’ 
that had emerged this way was reviewed and clearly restated by Foster’s students Marc R. 
Tool and Paul D. Bush, and further developed into a theoretical scheme of institutional forms 
and dynamics by P.D. Bush in the 1980s. The latter model had a great impact on 
institutionalist thinking on the process and variants of institutional change, and still has a 
great potential for modern evolutionary-institutional economics in general (see, e.g., O’Hara 
19971; Fayazmanesh, Tool (eds.) 1998. We will illustrate this through a reconsideration and 
comparison using a game-theoretic perspective. 
 
Characteristic of the institutionalist theory of institutional change are 
 
1. the conception of an institution as a value-behavior-structure, i.e., patterns of 
behaviors correlated by values; 
 
2. the instrumental, ceremonial, and ‘dialectical’ significance of such correlated 
patterns of behavior; 
 
3. the asymmetric logic and asymmetric operational principles of instrumental and 
ceremonial valuation; 
 
4. a scheme of specific value-behavior-structures resulting from those different 
significances of behaviors and from that asymmetry; 
 
5. the conception of degrees of ceremonial dominance in (or its reverse, the 
instrumental permissiveness of) a system’s institutional structure, as derived from 
that asymmetry; 
 
6. the definition of a partitioned institutional space, where typically a real-world 
institutional structure (or an economic system) is in the state of ceremonial 
encapsulation; 
 
7. resulting forms of institutional change, i.e., changes of the degree of ceremonial 
dominance, where typically there will be either an ongoing (enforced) ceremonial 
encapsulation (staying in the same sector of the institutional space, i.e., no change 
of degree), or regressive or progressive institutional change (increasing or 
decreasing degrees of ceremonial dominance); 
 
8. the consideration that progressive institutional change will not automatically occur 
but will require discretionary public-policy support, possible only in a pragmatist 
culture of a participatory and negotiated democratic process. 
 
                                                 
1
 To our knowledge, O’Hara 1997 was the only earlier attempt at both further analyzing the logic and applying 
(to economic systems) the institutionalist theory of institutional change. See also O’Hara, Tool 1998, 16-18, for a 
further logical clarification in terms of axiomatization and the development of a system of theorems. This paper 
considers itself somewhat in that tradition. 
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The game-theoretic perspective on institutions, on the other hand, is different, at first sight, 
beginning with the fact that institutions can be explained only in an instrumental sense, i.e., as 
a solution of a complex decision problem, typically a social dilemma structure. This also 
illustrates that the perspective is one of institutional emergence. 
 
Nevertheless, surprising similarities, equivalences, and complementarities between both 
perspectives turn out to exist so that a comparison, ‘translation’, and cross-fertilization appear 
feasible. For instance, while the game-theoretic perspective may benefit from the value 
sensitivity of institutionalism, the institutionalist analysis, in turn, may profit from some 
deeper logical analysis feasible through a game-theoretic conceptualization, e.g., a more 
specific explanation of the emergence of the ceremonial, and of policy design. 
 
This paper aims at 
 
1. illustrating the game-theoretic perspective on institutions with a most simple 
game-theoretic formalism; 
 
2. comparing and ‘translating’ back and forth the two conceptions of institutions, of 
the asymmetry of the two value systems, and of ceremonial dominance, thus 
indicating some surprising degree of equivalence between the two approaches; 
 
3. adding a simple explanation from the game-theoretic perspective of why 
ceremonial values emerge (and then dominate) at all, out of an ideal instrumental 
world; 
 
4. demonstrating that institutionalist and ‘institutional-game-theoretic’ perspectives 
share the policy conclusion that discretionary policy support is required to initiate, 
accelerate, and stabilize progressive institutional change, and that the game-
theoretically inspired conception of interactive/institutional policy may add some 
specific policy instruments. 
 
In the first section, we explain and compare the two conceptions of institutions. Section 2 
discusses institutions as value-behavior structures and introduces the ‘ceremonial’ and the 
‘instrumental’. The third section analyzes the asymmetry of this value structure, resulting 
asymmetric institutional structures, and in particular ceremonial dominance, each in both 
perspectives. Section 4 explains the process and forms of institutional change, particularly 
ceremonial encapsulation, and regressive/progressive institutional change. Section 5 explains 
the emergence of the ceremonial as a degeneration of the instrumental. Section 6 introduces 
and discusses the converging policy implications in both perspectives. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
 
1) The Two Conceptions of an ‘Institution’ Compared 
 
 
1.1) A Most Simple Game-Theoretic Formalism to Derive an ‘Instrumental’ Definition 
 
The simplest formal illustration of the game-theoretic institutional perspective is the static 
‘single-shot’ solution of a prisoners’ dilemma (PD). We have explained and elaborated 
elsewhere at length on the practical everyday relevance of the PD structure, the full 
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evolutionary ‘process story’ required for substantial explanation, a formal model of 
emergence (most effectively at certain ‘meso’ ‘platform’ sizes), and computer simulations of 
some core elements of that model (see, e.g., Elsner, Heinrich 2009, 2011, with relevant 
literature given there). 
 
The ‘single-shot’ just provides a logical condition for the superiority of cooperation, solving 
the dilemma problem, over defection. Assume a simple PD 2x2 normal-form matrix: 
 
a, a d, b 
b, d c, c 
 
with b > a > c > d, and a > (d + b)/2. As is well-known, the payoffs P in a ‘supergame’ (SG) 
for the cooperative tit-for-tat (TFT)2 player always encountering another TFT player, and for a 
defection (ALL D) player encountering a TFT player, with δ being the common discount 
factor, are 
 
PTFT/TFT = a + δa + δ2a + ... 
 
 
   a 
   =   ––––– 
          1 - δ 
 
and 
 
PALL D/TFT = b + δc + δ2c + ... 
 
     c 
     =   ––––– + b – c, 
             1 - δ 
 
resp. In an evolutionary perspective, cooperation pays (and may be successful in a population) 
if 
 
PTFT/TFT > PALL D/TFT, 
 
        → δ >! (b – a) / (b – c), 
 
as popularized for instance by Axelrod (1984/2006). 
 
According to this inequality, cooperation may become logically possible. But in fact it will 
have to emerge in a complex evolutionary process, as a new Nash equilibrium in the PD SG, 
different from the individualistic, hyper-rational, myopic ‘one-shot’ Nash equilibrium (NE) of 
a conventional game-theoretic perspective. 
 
The critical factors here are the given quantitative dilemma-prone incentive structure, i.e., the 
quantitative strength or weakness of the collective-good problem involved, a, b and c, relative 
to the common discount factor (δ), which can also be interpreted in a SG as the ‘probability to 
meet the same interaction partner again next interaction’, i.e., the importance of the common 
                                                 
2
 TFT always starts cooperatively (once or twice) and thereafter does what the other one has done the previous 
interaction. 
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future. Cooperation will come to be the superior strategy the easier (even in a population 
dominated by defection) the smaller the ‘opportunity costs of common cooperation’ (b - a ) in 
relation to the ‘opportunity costs of common defection’ (b - c), and the larger the importance 
of the future (δ). 
 
With some PD incentive structure given, the social terms, i.e., short- or long-run perspective, 
become crucial:  If society, and agents with each other, have a sufficiently long-run 
perspective of common futurity (a large δ), given a sufficient awareness of their common 
interdependence, they will be able to solve the problem of overcoming the dilemma by 
overcoming their short-run dominant individualistic incentive to defect. If, however, their 
common future does not count high, formally a small δ, the condition above will not hold [δ 
will be < (b-a)/(b-c)]. They will remain in the short-run individualistic NE of common 
defection, the social dilemma. 
 
[Note:  In an evolutionary game-theoretic perspective this would reflect the question whether 
a cooperative culture could be evolutionarily stable, i.e., could invade a defective population, 
and not being invaded (above a certain population share) by a defective culture. Axelrod 
(1984/2006) has argued with some superior (more long-run) commitment of cooperators. 
Long-run calculation may transform the PD into a less cumbersome coordination game, 
depending on the δ. ‘Meeting again’ may also have to do with the level of mobility, i.e., the 
probabilities of staying in or leaving the interaction ‘arena’, the size of a relevant social or 
spatial neighborhood, and other things. For the institutionalist tradition, the importance of 
futurity was extensively elaborated by John R. Commons (1934)]. 
 
We will not delve here into the manifold complex formal and theoretical aspects of an 
elaborated model and also will not explain all assumptions, elements, and implications of a 
full ‘process story’ required. Here, just some core aspects suffice: 
 
First, again, considering the solution above as a sequence or process, the institutional solution 
can not come about through narrowly rational agents, i.e., short-run maximizers. We cannot 
explain a process or mechanism to achieve the superior (‘Pareto-superior’) result with such 
‘hyper-rational’ behavior. This would, even in a SG process, only be capable of generating a 
series of one-shot NEs (common defection, where the inequality would not hold). Thus, even 
in a game-theoretic perspective, an institution can only emerge through some habituation, 
where agents learn to habitually abstain from striving from their short-run maximum. Thus, 
they would partly determine ‘their’ δs themselves. The institution will thus have to be a ‘semi-
conscious’ phenomenon -- and may remain in that semi-conscious state as long as 
expectations of conformity with it are met, supported by the conditions of a favorable 
numerical result of the inequality above (i.e., the payoff-superiority of common cooperation) 
and by mutually enforced cooperation. Therefore, institutional emergence is conditional on a 
learned broader and long-run rationality, overcoming the dominant short-run incentive to 
defect. That broader and long-run rationality will have to be habitually applied. [In contrast, 
the institution may be abandoned through a more or less deliberate consideration when a new 
(‘rational’) single-shot calculation (after some condition has changed) no longer justifies 
conformity with the old institution, i.e., when some ‘change’, ‘surprise’, ‘disappointment’, 
‘frustration’, or ‘becoming exploited’ by others may have occurred.] 
 
Second, introducing some stochastic aspect into individual behavior, the institution can 
emerge only on the basis of the individual motivations (1) to escape repeated frustration from 
common defection (from individualistically aspiring b and commonly receiving only c), and 
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(2) to learn and to increase knowledge, and particularly to explore what a different behavior, 
namely common cooperation, may bring about (idle curiosity as Veblen would have put it), or 
to find a way to improve one’s economic situation, resp. (to gain common a’s rather than c’s), 
a case for Veblen’s instinct of workmanship. That is, the payoffs for common cooperation 
may not even be known (‘incomplete information’ in game theory) but may get explored by 
searching and experimenting agents. The institution thus may emerge just out of an agent’s 
vision that there is more to be gained than repeated frustration. Agents who then make 
contributions to cooperation thus need to be imaginative, explorative, innovative, and creative. 
Therefore, broader agency capacities would need to be carefully defined for an evolutionary 
process, particularly for the game-theoretic perspective. 
 
Third, the agent who then starts to search and experiment with different behavior will have to 
contribute repeatedly to the change of the others’ expectations in favor of cooperation. The 
process, thus, is cumulative in the sense that all agents must repeatedly and interactively 
(sequentially) contribute (or, alternatively, will have to cumulatively punish each other). 
 
Fourth, these agents also have to be risk-taking and not too envious. The first to send a signal 
for a potential better common future will have to take the risk of being exploited, at least once 
(thus, better to offer cooperation twice in a row—tit-for-2-tat—before returning to defection). 
He also will never be able to compensate for this, as compared to the other, if common 
cooperation should start in response to his first cooperative action. This agent thus needs to be 
mainly focused on his own net gain which he has to compare only with his payoff under 
continued common defection. Compared to this, he clearly will be better off over time. 
 
Fifth, with agents starting to learn, search, and experiment, and individual behaviors thus 
becoming (stochastically) diversified (in our two-strategies world, this usually means starting 
cooperation from previous defection), we finally introduce a population perspective (a 
population with many agents, with initially unknown portions of defectors and cooperators). 
Agents then can no longer exactly tell the strategy of any particular other agent whom they 
(perhaps randomly) will be matched with next interaction (rather than meeting exactly the 
same again next interaction to sanction him for earlier cooperative or defective behavior, as in 
the simple single shot above). Behavior thus is considered somewhat random, and agents will 
have to experience the ‘true’ strategy shares in the population. The ‘pure’ expectation ‘to meet 
the same again’, δ, of the single shot above will be replaced by the expected ‘probability to 
meet a cooperative agent next interaction’, i.e., what we call ‘contingent trust’ δk (the no. of 
cooperators k over population size n). 
 
Sixth, while agents will have to experience such ‘contingent trust’, they will have to know 
about as many agents as possible. Thus, even more capabilities of agents may have to be 
considered. Instances and model components of such enhanced agency assumptions will be 
memory, monitoring, building reputation and transmitting it in reputation chains, and some 
active partner selection based on the knowledge generated by these mechanisms, i.e., some 
‘preferential matching’, for instance, according to some social and/or geographical 
neighborhood topology. 
 
In total, this indicates that in a (evolutionary) game-theoretic perspective the institution is as 
complex a thing as, and connected to an evolutionary process as complex as, in the 
institutionalist perspective, although there basically remains some ‘rational’ calculation at the 
core of the game-theoretic perspective. (‘Rational calculation’, however, may easily loose any 
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guiding potential for individual agents in a complex evolutionary process.3) However, the 
institution emerging so far is conceived of only as an instrumental device to solve a defined 
complex decision structure that could not be solved other than through habituated, i.e., 
institutionalized behavior with a learned broader rationality (‘recognized interdependence’) 
and a more long-run perspective of agents. The instrumental perspective of the game-theoretic 
conception of institutions is embedded in the theoretical and methodological perspective of 
institutional emergence. 
 
Against this background, a proper game-theoretic definition of an institution may be given as 
follows: 
 
An institution is a habitual social rule for the decision/behavior of individual agents for 
(infinitely, or indefinitely) recurrent and multipersonal (i.e., directly interdependent and thus 
genuinely social) situations (repeated direct interactions, supergames), with social 
coordination problems involved (particularly collective-good problems, social dilemmas), that 
has gained, through a process of social learning, a general approval so that it can inform the 
agents about mutual (and mutually consistent) expectations of behavior and about the fact that 
with unilateral deviation from the rule (i.e., unilateral defection) other agents also will deviate 
in the future so that eventually all will be worse-off with mutual defection than with rule-
conforming behavior (an endogenous sanction mechanism).4 
 
Now, despite this instrumental starting point, also the one-shot Nash solution of mutual 
defection in the lower right of the matrix, given in the individualistic, myopic, and hyper-
rational perspective, can of course be considered a ‘culture’. Repeated defection as an 
individualistic culture, however, can, in the game-theoretic perspective, be conceived of only 
in the sense of a more simple social rule, which does not need the endogenous sanction 
mechanism nor a habituation to make people adhere to it. In a recurrent one-shot perspective, 
agents would just spontaneously follow repeatedly and schematically their individualistic, 
short-run, hyper-rational ‘best answer’ and ‘dominant strategy’ by mutually defecting. We 
call this a social rule rather than an institution. A social rule is what individualistic agents 
follow spontaneously, in their very short-run individualistic interest, given the same behavior 
of others. This coordination is a ‘negative’ one in a PD (common defection) but may also 
reflect a ‘positive’ coordination in a so called coordination game. Note that, hyper-rational 
individuals do not need to overcome a complex problem here in order to establish defection as 
their behavioral (social) rule. A social rule applies whenever it is in the interest of an 
individual to behave that way when the other one behaves that way too, even in a short-run 
‘one-shot’ perspective. Social rules also apply to any simple coordination game where it is in 
everyone’s interest just to be coordinated (see basic traffic rules as the usual prototype). In the 
PD SG, common defection thus may easily be established as a social rule. If I (have to) 
assume that the other one defects, I am (hyper-rationally) forced to defect myself. However, 
other than in a coordination game, there will be no problem solved in a PD through this way 
of ‘coordination’.5 
                                                 
3
 Just to note that in complex models, evolutionary process with replication and an ever-changing social 
environment may easily make prediction (calculation) of relative individual success impossible and hence proper 
rational individual decision infeasible. Even if proper regarding the past, any ‘rational’ decision may turn out to 
be wrong under the new environment of the next generation. 
4
 This game-theoretic definition of an instrumental institution, referring to a PD problem structure, where the 
solution requires habituation, a sacrifice of the short-run maximum, and hence an endogenous sanction 
mechanism, was basically developed first by Schotter (1981). 
5
 Note also that on this basis, the solution of a dilemma is specifically called ‘cooperation’, while the solution of 
a coordination game is called just ‘coordination’—and while the umbrella term for both would be also 
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In other words, there appears an obvious asymmetry between the ‘culture’ of instrumental 
problem-solving through cooperation motivated by the striving for problem solving and the 
‘culture’ of defection motivated by individualist myopic maximization. The social institution 
of cooperation is fundamentally more requiring than commonly following just a 
(individualistic) social rule of defection. 
 
The latter case also includes unilateral defection, thus exploitation of the other one, if the 
other one for some reason can be led to stick to cooperation. Therefore, also the upper right 
and lower left constellations are included in that individualistic ‘culture’. This, in turn, implies 
that the true motivation here is not just individualist myopic maximization, but in fact the 
striving for exploitation of the other one (or to prevent getting exploited oneself)—as the PD 
payoff structure obviously indicates. Hence, the true motivation, justification, and normative 
warrant here is what Veblen has termed invidious distinction, embedded, though, in a short-
run maximization behavior. Note that the latter is impossible without exploitation. The 
motivation to defect in any of these cases (unilateral or mutual defection) is to exploit the 
other one and to gain differential status and power—an underlying ceremonial valuation (to 
anticipate the institutionalist argument below). 
 
If all are that clever, general mutual defection necessarily follows. But, if an additional story 
about lasting power and status differentials in a hierarchical environment can be told so that 
the other agent can be convinced to continue to cooperate, to accept the superior’s position 
and his own inferior position, we may also consider ‘cultures’ of unequal constellations (see 
below Section 5.2). 
 
But let us consider first the institutionalist ‘story’ in more detail now. 
 
 
1.2) The Institutionalist Definition – and its Equivalence With the Game-Theoretic 
Perspective 
 
Bush (1987) defines an institution as 
 
‘a set of socially prescribed patterns of correlated behavior’ (p. 1076). 
 
While this is consistent with most definitions in the institutionalist tradition, it needs some 
clarification in relation to our game-theoretically informed definition as a device to ‘solve’ a 
specified social dilemma problem. 
 
‘Patterns’ of Behavior 
First, ‘patterns of behavior’ can be easily and straightforwardly translated just into 
‘behavioral social rules’ in a broad sense, where institutions (= rules ‘plus sanctions’) are 
included. The patterns will typically be a structure with a time dimension (over time) and an 
interpersonal or social dimension (across agents). 
 
‘Prescribed’ Patterns -- Instrumental Norms 
Second, ‘socially prescribed’ stresses the fact that institutions typically appear to the 
individual agents as normative phenomena and prescriptions (be they objectively instrumental 
or ceremonial), while the original ‘functional’ (instrumental) context of their emergence (as 
                                                                                                                                                        
coordination. Similarly, we use social rules as a general umbrella term for both institutions as defined (rules plus 
sacrifice and sanctions) and specific social rules, where coordination is in everyone’s individualistic interest. 
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illustrated in the game-theoretic perspective above) has often faded away in an individual 
lifetime or over generations of a population. Correspondingly, Bush stresses the idea of an 
‘(instrumental) norm’:  The idea of social prescription would apply, and perhaps particularly 
so, to 
 
‘all problem-solving (purposive) behavior. The community at large has a stake in the manner 
in which its tools and intelligence are brought to bear on its life processes. Those patterns of 
behavior perceived to be vital to the survival of the community are the most carefully 
prescribed and carry the heaviest sanctions’ (p. 1077). 
 
This ‘norm’ is mostly not just a behavioral rule (or institution) conveyed by social 
conditioning and enculturation and not just some semi-conscious habituation, but the explicit 
feeling of individuals of a socially required behavior, whether instrumental or ceremonial. 
(We will discuss later how we can derive such ‘norm’-atization and then even 
‘ceremonialization’ out of a benchmark of an ideal instrumental ‘functional’ problem-solving 
behavior—see Section 5.2.) 
 
‘Correlated’ Behavior 
Third, the idea of ‘correlated’ behavior, in particular, is not that obvious, from a game-
theoretic perspective. 
 
• In our ‘instrumental’ derivation of institutional emergence in a game-theoretic 
context, behaviors are correlated, first, between two agents who ‘correlate’ their 
behaviors in face of a problem at hand, be this ‘correlated’ (mutual) cooperation or 
(mutual) defection in a PD, the two basic forms of ‘coordination’ in a PD. 
Correlation here, therefore, is just some ‘coordination’ in a broad sense. In the 
first instance, it would apply even to a single action of each agent, i.e., a one-shot 
decision (one interaction, a game played just once). 
 
• Furthermore, any such behavior must be correlated also over time, as a recurrent, 
repetitive, and thus rule- or institution-based behavior (remember the fact that we 
argued in a SG, particularly a sequential process). In fact, a rule or institution 
would be no full-fledged rule/institution (or ‘coordinated strategies’) if it was not 
repetitive/recurrent, and thus correlated with itself over time. 
 
‘Patterns of correlated behavior’, thus, also means that institutional behavior 
 
‘is not random but purposeful’, and in this sense ‘correlated’ (ibid.). 
 
A ‘Set’ of Patterns of Behavior 
Fourth, a ‘set’ of correlated behavior thus may refer either to a set of coordinated (pairs of) 
agents carrying the rule or institution at one point of time and/or the set of repetitions of 
coordinated behaviors of pairs of agents, i.e., a set of coordinated actions over time. 
 
It should have become clear from this that game-theoretic modeling may be of some help to 
sort the different logical dimensions of ‘a set of patterns of correlated behavior’. For an 
illustration of the mentioned components of the institutionalist definition of an institution, see 
Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Components of the Institutionalist Definition of an Institution as ‘Sets of 
Correlated Behavior’--Illustration. 
 
 
Repetition of 
Interaction 
No. of Agents 
Involved 
 
 
Once (‘one-shot’) 
(‘correlation’ just across agents) 
 
Many Over Time (recurrent, sequential) 
(‘correlation’ cross-sectional & 
longitudinal) 
 
 
Two 
(one pairing) 
 
Behaviors ‘correlated’ between two 
agents 
 
 
A ‘pattern’ of behaviors 
‘correlated’ between two agents and with 
themselves over time 
 
 
 
Many Pairs 
(in a population) 
 
 
A ‘set’ of behaviors ‘correlated’ 
within each pair of agents and 
among pairs 
(with the no. of elements of the set 
equal to the no. of pairs) 
 
 
A ‘set’ of ‘patterns’ of ‘correlated’ 
behavior (within each pair and among 
pairs) ‘correlated’ with themselves over 
time (with the no. of elements of the set 
equating the no. of pairs). 
 
 
For an illustration of the logic of the components of a rule or institution, from an individual 
action to a ‘set of patterns of correlated behavior’, see Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: The Logic of a ‘Set of Patterns of Correlated Behavior’--Illustration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
A, B = a behavior, an individual action (one agent’s action at one point of time); 
C = behaviors (actions) A and B ‘correlated’ between (at least) two agents (at one point of time); 
D, E = ‘patterns’ of behavior (of each one agent), each ‘correlated’ only with itself over time; 
F = a ‘pattern’ of behaviors C, ‘correlated’ with itself over time (a social rule or institution); 
G = a ‘set’ of ‘patterns’ of behaviors C, ‘correlated’ among (at least two) pairs of agents; 
H = a ‘set’ of ‘patterns’ of behaviors G, ‘correlated’ with itself over time. 
 
 
 
 
 
No. of 
Agents / 
Pairs 
t 
F 
… 
 
 
Agent 4 
(interacting) 
Agent 3 
 
 
 
Agent 2 
(interacting) 
Agent 1 
1              2              3  … 
A 
B 
C 
E 
 
D 
G 
 
 
… 
H 
… 
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2) Values Correlating Patterns of Behavior:  Instrumental or Ceremonial Warrant 
 
 
Another important aspect, specific of the epistemological sophistication of Institutionalism, 
which has not been explicitly accounted for in the game-theoretic treatment so far, is values. 
As Bush puts it: 
 
‘Values function as the “correlators” of behavior within and among patterns of behavior’. 
[That is] ‘two behaviors [..] [are] correlated by a value’ (p. 1077). 
 
However, this appears reconcilable as well with a game-theoretic perspective as already 
indicated:  Consider again that cooperative behaviors in a PD (or coordinated behavior in a 
coordination game, if a Pareto-superior coordination—out of two coordinations in a 2x2 
normal form—exists and is attained or aspired6) are correlated through the instrumental 
valuation (the motivation, or norm) of problem-solving, i.e., overcoming the very dilemma. 
This instrumental motive or basic valuation seems quite obvious:  We have to assume that 
agents are motivated to cooperate through a prior value-decision to solve a common and 
collective problem to improve their situation. 
 
Intended hyper-rational maximization, on the other hand, i.e., putting oneself above and trying 
to exploit the other one, and, thus, either unilateral or mutual exploitation (unilateral or 
mutual defection), are justifiable—also in game-theoretic terms—in no other way than 
through the prior fundamental valuation of invidious distinction, i.e., the striving for superior 
power and status, in a word, through what institutionalists since Veblen have called 
ceremonial value. According to ceremonial values, agents are after distinction, differential 
status and power, rather than problem-solving. 
 
The ‘correlating’ role of instrumental and ceremonial values now has been most important for 
the institutionalist argument and scheme of institutional dynamics. While game theory can 
both learn from this and contribute to its logical analysis, the theory of institutional change 
has paved a way already through the elaboration of a system of resulting potential forms of 
value-behavior-structures. 
 
The basic value-behavior-scheme (or structure) is 
 
B-V-B, 
 
with V for the correlating value and B for the behaviors. V ‘correlates’ behaviors B, again 
among both agents and over time. 
 
Note that there can be different interconnected constellations of values and patterns of 
behaviors, among agents and/or over time, where 
 
‘the correlation of [two] behavioral patterns entails a [third] behavioral pattern’ (p. 1078), 
 
as illustrated according to Bush’s explanation in Figure 3. 
 
                                                 
6
 The prototype in modern complexity economics of such a coordination game with two different coordination 
solutions, a Pareto-inferior and a Pareto-superior one, is W. B. Arthur’s model of a random technology choice 
with two different technologies (superior, inferior)—see Arthur (1989). 
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Figure 3: Behaviors Correlated by Values, Among Agents and Over Time--Illustration. 
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Agents or Over 
Time 
Correlation Over 
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B1 
 
V1 
 
B2 
 
   
V2 
 
 
 
B4 
 
V3 
 
B3 
 
 
For instance, while two pairs of ‘(patterns of) behavior’ [of each two agents, (1, 2) and (3, 4)], 
(B1, B2) and (B3, B4), may be ‘correlated’ by instrumental values (V1, V3), the (patterns of) 
behaviors of agents 2 and 3, B2 and B3, may be ‘correlated’ by ceremonial value V2. Similarly, 
behaviors might be instrumentally ‘correlated’ across agents, but ceremonially correlated over 
time. 
 
Since the relationship between two patterns of behavior is fundamentally characterized by the 
type of V (instrumental or ceremonial), institutional change basically requires a change of the 
value basic to that institutional structure. We will return to this later. 
 
 
 
3) The Asymmetry in the Dichotomic Institutional Structure: 
Ceremonial Dominance and Ceremonial Encapsulation 
 
 
3.1) The Asymmetric Value Structure in Both Perspectives 
 
Again, behavior warranted by ceremonial values is based on invidious distinction, and 
aspirations of differential status and power. The logic of ceremonial warrant of 
institutionalized patterns of behavior is, as Veblen has already put it, one of 
 
‘sufficient reason’, 
 
which means that ceremonial values refer to just tradition, received authority, some 
plausibility, suitable myths, etc., and are beyond critical scrutiny or scientific inquiry. The 
operative criterion for such behavior thus is 
 
‘ceremonial adequacy’, 
 
i.e., just conformity to the legitimizations of differential power and status without any proof of 
real efficacy–conformity to the myths is just sufficient (cf. Bush, pp. 1079-80). 
 
Instrumental values, on the other hand, are bound to problem solving, and thus the logic of 
instrumental warrant is that of 
 
‘efficient cause’ 
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rather than just ‘sufficient reason’. The operative criterion by which instrumentally warranted 
behavior is judged, therefore, is that of 
 
‘instrumental efficiency’ 
 
(rather than ‘ceremonial adequacy’), i.e., efficacy. 
 
Typically, with new ‘technological’ knowledge (in the broadest sense), instrumental behavior, 
particularly if warranted by instrumental value, will have to be scrutinized and adapted. 
Proper (instrumental) behavioral adaptation, in turn, will ‘require changes in the instrumental 
values that correlate such behavior’ (p. 1080), i.e., change to reinforce instrumental valuing. 
 
With this, there also are two basic types of patterns of behavior that would consistently and 
fully relate to the two valuations, i.e., instrumentally and ceremonially warranted patterns. 
 
In game-theoretic terms, and in the context of a social dilemma, we have made the distinction 
between an instrumentally warranted institution and a ceremonially warranted social rule7, 
reflecting already the above mentioned asymmetry. In particular, dilemma-solving behavior is 
subject to the value criterion of ‘efficient cause’ or ‘instrumental efficiency’, an effort with a 
learning process attaining the Pareto-superior solution8, while defective behavior in a PD can 
be considered to be subject to ‘sufficient reason’, i.e., just the belief and hope that the agent 
can (and should) gain a maximum in the short run, which he knows he can only attain at the 
expense of the others. The institutionalist value-asymmetry thus neatly applies to that game-
theoretic problem setting so that the game theoretic perspective could be opened up for more 
institutionalist input. 
 
 
3.2) Resulting Institutionalist Value-Behavior Structures 
 
This has several implications for resulting value-behavior structures: 
 
• First, as said, it is immediately intelligible that there are two pure types of specific 
value-behavior schemes that consistently relate to one of the two valuations: 
 
Bc-Vc-Bc 
and 
Bi-Vi-Bi , 
 
where c and i stand for ceremonial and instrumental, resp. 
 
• Second, however, real-world behavior typically is ‘dialectical’ in the sense that 
both ceremonial and instrumental characteristics are involved. 
 
                                                 
7
 Note that in a 2x2 coordination game with two different coordination equilibria, i.e., two social rules (a 
superior and an inferior one), both probably would have to be considered instrumentally warranted (at least the 
superior one). 
8
 Note that the use of the Pareto criterion (PC) throughout this paper is confined to the simple examples of 
symmetric payoff matrices with two different potential equilibria. We do not want to argue that the PC in general 
would lead us far in evolutionary-institutional economics. 
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For example, institutionalists from Veblen on have dealt with such ‘dialectical’ 
behavior:  Fashion clothing is both instrumental clothing and ceremonial distinction, 
and the professor’s teaching behind the lectern is both instrumental teaching and 
ceremonial status differentiation between himself and the students. Veblen and Ayres 
have also investigated the ‘ceremonial cleanliness’ of the upper classes, the ‘cult of 
the tub’, with its waste of hot water, which has become particularly relevant in recent 
times of body and beauty cults, ubiquitous hot showers and one-arm water taps that 
always admix hot water, and water pollution with all kinds of detergents, mostly used 
in huge abundance, of the ubiquitous ‘sanitation’ and ‘beauty’ industries (see also 
examples and discussion given by Bush, pp. 1081 f.). 
 
This means there are patterns of behavior to be symbolized by Bci (or equivalently, 
Bic), which are ambivalent. Thus, its final significance depends on the type of value 
that correlates them. Hence, the following forms can be added to the list of specific 
schemes (see Bush, pp. 1082-4): 
 
Bci-Vc-Bci and Bci-Vi-Bci 
and also 
Bc-Vc-Bci and Bi-Vi-Bci . 
 
That is, both ceremonial and instrumental values can correlate either two 
‘dialectical’ patterns of behavior or one ‘pure’ form of their own kind with another 
‘dialectical’ form. 
 
• Third, the asymmetry between instrumental and ceremonial modes of valuation, as 
mentioned, causes an asymmetry between the value-behavior-structures that 
instrumental or ceremonial values warrant. 
 
Particularly, the instrumental logic and operational criterion of efficient cause and 
instrumental efficiency are inapplicable to purely ceremonial behavior: 
 
‘Instrumental valuation cannot rationalize purely ceremonial behavior’ (p. 1083). 
 
The ceremonial logic and operational criterion of sufficient reason and ceremonial 
adequacy, on the other hand, are less limited:  Any behavior, including 
instrumental behavior, may be ‘rationalized’, absorbed, used, or misused, by 
ceremonial valuation, since its logic and operational criterion are ‘weaker’, so to 
speak, i.e., less demanding. 
 
For example, think of the massive progress made in the natural, technological, 
organizational, medical, psychological or social sciences (including, by the way, game 
theory) through arms and warfare research, typically justified by myths like ‘our 
nation is under threat’, ‘we need to help others who are under threat’, ‘they don’t 
share our values’, ‘they are different’, etc. Also, you may think of the justification of 
some reasonable and effective social caring behavior within and through the churches 
through ‘the will of god’, or of other socially effective behaviors through ‘the national 
interest’, ‘the interest of the economy’, etc. In fact, there has been generated a rich 
stock of applied institutionalist research on such issues since Veblen’s critical 
analyses of the typical dominating myths and belief systems. 
 
In game-theoretic terms, we would have to consider again the exploitation 
constellations in the upper right and lower left cells of the 2x2 PD matrix, where 
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instrumental (cooperative) behavior of some agents would be dominated by others 
who are motivated by invidious payoff maximization for their own benefit. Thus, 
we would have to assume that the whole situations then are dominated and 
characterized by the ceremonial valuation. This clearly would go beyond any 
conventional game-theoretic perspective and would require additional 
assumptions, theoretical justification, and proper ‘story-telling’. Game theory 
obviously is not well prepared for the conception of lasting asymmetric behaviors. 
But again we refer to such additional story-telling about the emergence of a 
dominating ceremonial warrant out of an instrumentally warranted behavioral 
solution in Section 5.2 below. 
 
 
3.3) ‘Ceremonial Encapsulation’ in Particular 
 
In case of such ceremonial enclosure of ‘dialectical’ or of purely instrumental patterns of 
behavior, institutionalists are talking of encapsulation: 
 
‘In these instances, instrumental behavior is “encapsulated” within a ceremonially warranted 
behavioral pattern, thereby incorporating instrumental behavior in a ceremonially prescribed 
outcome’ (p. 1084). 
 
For instance, Marx’s conception of ‘moral depreciation’, i.e., premature scrapping of 
commodities under the pressures of competitive race among firms, would fall into this 
category of both and concurrent instrumental and ceremonial dimensions of behavior, where 
commodities may display some instrumentally reduced functioning but in fact will 
prematurely be put to waste as they no longer function as a vehicle of invidious distinction 
(e.g., are no longer fashionable or no longer a cutting-edge model of a technology), a more 
symbolic and signaling action. The case could be symbolized by Bc-Vc-Bci or Bci-Vc-Bci as 
already introduced, but also by Bc-Vc-Bi and even Bci-Vc-Bi , as introduced below. 
 
The forms of ceremonial encapsulation, thus, are manifold. First, it may occur with ‘pure’ 
behaviors, where purely instrumental behavior is correlated with purely ceremonial behavior, 
the first being dominated and encapsulated by ceremonial valuing: 
 
Bc-Vc-Bi . 
 
A ‘weaker’ form (or stronger rather?) correlates purely instrumental behavior with 
‘dialectical’ behavior (and encapsulates both), i.e., even ‘dialectical’ and purely instrumental 
behaviors can be encapsulated to serve a ceremonially prescribed outcome: 
 
Bci-Vc-Bi . 
 
Note that these two forms can not have parallels under ‘instrumental conditions’. Because of 
the asymmetry, instrumental values cannot justify any purely ceremonial behavior, so no 
constellations Bi-Vi-Bc and Bci-Vi-Bc are feasible. Similarly, and obviously, no constellation 
Bc-Vi-Bc is feasible.  
 
But also, Bi-Vc-Bi is no possible constellation, as ceremonial values cannot justify only pure 
instrumental behaviors. 
 
See Figure 4 for an overview of these forms. 
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Figure 4: The Forms of Ceremonially and Instrumentally Warranted Patterns of Behavior 
(Variants of Value-Behavior-Schemes) (after Bush, p. 1082). 
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For the game-theoretic perspective we would immediately be able to draw an obvious first 
rough analogy of some basic cases for a normal form PD: 
 
 
Bi-Vi-Bi 
 
 
Bi-Vc-Bc 
 
Bc-Vc-Bi 
 
 
Bc-Vc-Bc 
 
 
The integration of more cases would require additional assumptions and considerations. 
However, it appears sufficient here to demonstrate that we indeed can translate basic game-
theoretic cases into basic institutionalist value-behavior structures. 
 
 
3.4) ‘Ceremonial Dominance’ and the ‘Permissiveness’ of the Institutional Structure 
 
The asymmetry between the logics of ‘ceremonial’ and ‘instrumental’ valuation according to 
which ceremonial warrant can encapsulate more forms of behavior, is consistent with, and in 
fact stems from, the general comprehension of institutions in the Veblenian tradition 
according to which institutions are always and unavoidably past-bound, and thus prone to a 
ceremonial dominance, particularly in traditional, hierarchical, and predatory societies. 
 
However, specific cultures and nations, in fact, vary in the ‘permissiveness’ of their 
institutional arrangements (value-behavior-structures) vis-à-vis new (‘technological’) 
knowledge (‘increases of the social knowledge fund’). Some few have been allowing for a 
(‘progressive’) change towards more instrumentally warranted behavioral patterns. Hence 
that asymmetry and the resulting ceremonial dominance are a ‘gradual’ phenomenon. An 
ideal ‘index of ceremonial dominance’ (to be formalized yet9) would be inversely related to 
the degree of permissiveness:  The higher that index, i.e., the greater ceremonial dominance, 
                                                 
9
 However, see O’Hara 1997, 112-16, for a formal operationalization and application of an ICD for the cases 
under investigation there. We do not need to delve deeper into this here. 
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the lower the permissiveness of the institutional structure of an economy towards new 
knowledge and its full instrumental use. 
 
In game-theoretic terms, we may think of some technological or organizational change, 
causing a change of the payoff structure, 
 
1. e.g., in a coordination game with a Pareto-superior and a Pareto-inferior 
coordination solution, so that the former superior coordination becomes the 
inferior one and vice versa, 
 
2. transforming a coordination game into a PD and vice versa, 
 
3. increasing the relative payoffs for common cooperation in a PD so that common 
defection pays relatively less and cooperation becomes easier feasible in a 
supergame process, and vice versa (while the PD structure as such is maintained). 
 
Also, we might assume some change in other external conditions so that the expectations 
change (i.e., the discount factor δ) with implications for the probabilities with which 
instrumentally or ceremonially warranted behavioral patterns come to prevail in an 
evolutionary process in a population. 
 
Combining changes in knowledge, payoffs, and expectations (and thus—in the game-theoretic 
perspective—in the long-run calculations of relative benefits and costs of different strategies) 
with the valuing aspect we may say that the more ‘permissive’ the value structure in games 
undergoing such changes would be, e.g., the more the agents will be after long-run and 
inclusive problem solving (Vc → Vi), the more a behavioral change towards a new, adapted, 
and now proper and superior, solution would appear feasible in each of these cases. 
 
However, note that, in game theory, as already the simple single-shot solution above reveals, 
we have to consider that in the usual interpretation the degree of permissiveness itself is not 
only positively related to, but in fact changes uno actu with the long-run calculations of the 
agents based on both the payoff structure and the importance of the common future (δ)—some 
more ‘rational’, calculative explanation of the relative weights of the two types of values. 
Particularly, with favorable calculative conditions, agents, in the game-theoretic perspective, 
will usually be more inclined towards instrumentally warranted solutions—if not other 
aspects that may explain a ceremonial dominance would prevail. The latter will indeed play a 
role in the specific argument in favor of dominant ceremonialism that we will deal with in 
Section 5.2. 
 
 
 
4) The Process and Forms of Institutional Change 
 
 
4.1) Combinations of Instrumental vs. Ceremonial ‘Feasibilities’:  The ‘Institutional 
Space’ 
 
It follows from the above that new knowledge, together with related instrumental patterns of 
behavior, can be either ‘encapsulated’ within ceremonially warranted patterns of behavior or 
‘embedded’ within instrumentally warranted patterns of behavior. 
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While new knowledge basically supports instrumental valuation (see our argument above on 
the support of a proper set of conditions and a ‘favorable’ calculation for instrumentally 
warranted solutions), the ‘index of ceremonial dominance’ eventually is indicative of the 
degree in which new knowledge is allowed to be used in the community’s problem-solving 
process. For instance, under strong ceremonial dominance, 
 
‘knowledge that cannot be reconciled with the need to justify existing patterns of status, 
power, and other forms of invidious distinctions would not be intentionally sanctioned’ (p. 
1091). 
 
The asymmetric structure between ceremonial and instrumental warrant, ‘allowance’, or 
‘feasibility’ of behaviors now defines an ‘institutional space’ within which we not only can 
define different sectors according to these value or feasibility constellations, but furthermore 
can also illustrate the motions of institutional change (Bush, p. 1092; see Figure 5 below, with 
the formal B-V-B structures added that apply in each case): 
 
(1a) When behavioral patterns are both instrumentally feasible (warranted, allowed 
for) and ceremonially feasible (warranted, allowed for), in this way meeting both 
‘sufficient reason’ and ‘efficient cause’, or ‘ceremonial adequacy’ and 
‘instrumental efficiency’, we clearly face the case (and sector) of ceremonial 
encapsulation since this implies (because of the asymmetry) a dominant 
ceremonial warrant. Here then, the institutional structure of an economy allows for 
benefiting from instrumental behavior that at the same time can be ceremonially 
justified and utilized, misused, and, in fact, encapsulated (see Figure 5, upper left 
sector). 
 
(1b) In dynamic terms, if an increase in the knowledge fund would trigger 
compensatory efforts not to change the value structure, the system would remain 
in the upper left sector of both instrumental and ceremonial feasibility under 
ceremonial warrant, a case of ongoing and enforced ceremonial encapsulation 
(remaining in the upper left sector). 
 
(2a) If behavioral patterns were instrumentally infeasible but ceremonially feasible 
under dominant ceremonial valuation (ceremonial warrant), they were purely 
ceremonial, a complete dominance of the ‘myth structure’, a full ‘loss of 
instrumental efficiency’ (p. 1092), with instrumentally warranted patterns 
completely excluded (upper right sector). We are talking of quasi-religious effects 
here. 
 
(2b) In a dynamic perspective, if ceremonial dominance would further increase and 
the economy moved from the ceremonial-encapsulation subspace into this sector, 
excluding more and more instrumental behaviors, this would be indicative of 
‘regressive’ institutional change, i.e., an even greater dominance of ceremonial 
over instrumental values (and behaviors), of total ideology, myths, and received 
belief systems over knowledge (moving from the upper left to the upper right 
sector). 
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(3a) Finally, those parts of behavioral patterns that are instrumentally feasible but 
ceremonially infeasible will normally be excluded under ceremonial dominance 
(lower left sector). 
 
(3b) In a dynamic perspective, however, if ceremonial dominance could be reduced 
after an increase in the social knowledge fund, this would be indicative of 
‘progressive’ institutional change, i.e., an increasing weight of instrumental over 
ceremonial values and with this of instrumental behaviors. Then the economy 
would move from the upper left into the lower left sector. 
 
Figure 5: The ‘Institutional Space’ in the Interface of Instrumental Feasibility (Warrant) 
and Ceremonial Feasibility (Warrant). 
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Note: (1) = Ongoing/enforced Ceremonial Encapsulation (with a constant ceremonial dominance). 
(2) = Regressive Institutional Change (increasing ceremonial dominance). 
(3) = Progressive Institutional Change (decreasing ceremonial dominance). 
 
 
4.2) The Forms of Institutional Change in Particular 
 
As said, institutional change is defined by a change in (the ‘index’ of) ceremonial dominance 
which in turn only occurs with a change in the value structure (Bush, p. 1094), i.e., in the 
relative dominance of ceremonial or instrumental warrant. And there were three forms of 
institutional change identified: 
 
(3) 
(2) 
(1) 
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(1) Ongoing and enforced ceremonial encapsulation will then imply that any increase of 
the knowledge fund, any new knowledge, and thus any potential increase of instrumental 
patterns of behavior will be offset, under a continuing dominance of ceremonial values in the 
community, by concomitant or reactive increases in ceremonial ‘mythology’ and valuation, 
and thus ceremonial patterns of behavior are supported and instrumental behavior 
encapsulated. The status quo ante will be maintained and reinforced. 
 
In this case the ‘index’ of ceremonial dominance and the value structure basically remain 
unchanged. 
 
As a major example, consider the huge technical progress made in the last decades through the 
digital microelectronic technologies. Now consider, what part of the effective use of the new 
facilities and equipment is devoted to just ceremonial activities rather than effective potential 
social problem-solving and related communication, information, and calculation. What part is 
used, in contrast, to rather divert people from social (and individual) problem-solving, 
engaging them in just killing time, distracting them from the social problems as well as their 
individual problems, tending to make them addicted, involving them in ‘sex&crime’ worlds 
(virtual or real), promoting global sex&crime industries, money laundering, generating and 
promoting violence, social isolation, invidious distinctions, but also surveillance and control, 
and so forth … ? (see, e.g., Adkisson 2004, particularly on ceremonialism with respect to 
intellectual property rights). One might try to make an empirical estimation of instrumental vs. 
ceremonial portions in the real use of those technologies. 
 
Also, for instance, consider the newest and most expensive computer acquired by the 
company for the office desk of the CEO (who rarely works at his desk and makes little use of 
that computer) rather than for the chief engineer who could make much of it. Also, mostly 
parking lots close to the main entry of firms are reserved for the most ceremonial, fancy and 
expensive vehicles of the bosses. 
 
Banks headquarters, public celebrations, business fashion, sitting orders, business rules, 
ritualized mass media representations of reality, etc. provide endless instances of ceremonially 
warranted rules that appear as abstract and thus particularly strict norms. 
 
Furthermore, decentralized systems based on net-technologies and independent agents 
nets in the new economy may be dominated and restricted by big powerful bureaucratic 
hierarchies of international corporations. They form supplier networks that are hierarchically 
directed and restricted by the powerful hub of such a global hierarchy, i.e., hub & spoke 
networks that have come to dominate the global spatial organization of industries nowadays. 
Many power-based contractual nets have turned out, through critical institutional analyses, to 
be less problem-solving constructions but rather complicated machines to generate windfall 
profits accruing at the most powerful agents (see, e.g., Hayden and Bolduc 2000). 
 
Ongoing or enforced ceremonial encapsulation may occur in two subtypes: 
 
• Past-binding ceremonial encapsulation:  This is the situation of existing power 
and status oriented ‘predatory’ societies that institutionalists since Veblen have 
always considered typical and where they have seen the general ‘past-binding’ 
character of institutions realized, and a permanent ’cultural lag’ occurring in the 
adjustment of the institutional structure in relation to increased knowledge. 
 
Here, it typically is attempted 
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‘to minimize the impact of the technological innovation on existing habits of thought 
and behavior […] conscious efforts are made to shore up the existing value structure 
by an elaboration of ceremonial practices designed to minimize the innovation’s 
dislocation of the status quo’ (p. 1094). 
 
For example, you may think here of norms and prescriptions trying to restrict the 
(instrumental) application of new knowledge (and communication over it) or to keep 
new knowledge from becoming applied by the regular individual or household for 
their individual problem solving, e.g. the increasing authoritarian regulation of the 
internet. 
 
This can be considered a more reactive and defensive type of institutional change. 
 
• Future-binding ceremonial encapsulation:  Some innovations may ‘slip through’ 
and trigger an increased weight of instrumental behavior, since 
 
‘Veblen’s “instinct of workmanship” appears to manifest itself even under the most 
trying ceremonial circumstances’ (p. 1093). 
 
This can be considered a more active and offensive type of institutional change, 
designed to 
 
‘strengthening and extending the control of vested interests over the life of the 
community’ (p. 1095). 
 
Vested interests here effectively control the future of the community, and change 
in the existing patterns of valuation and behavior, including the organization of the 
economy and society, will be avoided. 
 
As an instance, you may think here of the fact that in face of an ongoing and 
increasing environmental disruption virtually everything and any product will be 
advertized nowadays as ‘biological’, ‘organic’, ‘sustainable’, and ’green’, how 
disastrous its ecological footprint balance may actually ever be, e.g., from ‘organic’ 
industrial food that in fact causes obesity, to ‘green cars’ that may be more efficient 
but, in fact, still have considerable, and often even more, climate-changing emissions, 
often through larger engines, more horse power, and greater maximum speed. 
 
You may also think here of the efforts and power of international oligopolistic 
corporations of the agrofood and ‘biotech’ industries to collect genetic information 
from all over the world in order to control global agricultural and biological 
production in the future, and with this hundreds of millions of farmers and trillions of 
consumers. 
 
In fact, many institutionalists like L.F. Junker, F.G. Hayden, and W.M. Dugger have 
empirically investigated this type of ceremonial encapsulation in the very fields of 
pathogenic corporate agricultural and food production that causes public health to 
continuously deteriorate (see Bush, pp. 1095 ff.). 
 
(2) Regressive institutional change, on the other hand, will displace instrumentally 
feasible and dialectical behavior, as indicated, i.e., an extreme case where ceremonial 
practices will not only dominate instrumental ones, but substitute them and in the end even 
imitate instrumental efficiency. It is the case of increasing ceremonial dominance, consistent 
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with what Veblen had coined ‘the triumph of imbecile institutions over life and culture’ (cited 
by Bush, p. 1101). 
 
Bush calls this a ‘Lysenko’ effect, according to the Russian agrobiologist who elaborated a 
bogus genetic theory suggesting an extreme version of Lamarckism where genetic change 
could be man-made, ‘managed’, in one generation of plants, just through environmental 
conditioning–thus causing huge damage to the Soviet agro-economy in the 1930s and 1940s. 
 
You may also think of the quasi-religious ‘theories’ of the Nazis and all kinds of simplistic 
‘Social Darwinisms’ about supremacy and inferiority of races and nations, where they 
measured heads and bones to prove their myths. 
 
Similar movements are getting en vogue anew in the current crises in many developed and 
allegedly worldly, secular, and ‘enlightened’ countries. You may think of the surge of 
dangerous quasi-religious propaganda and anti-rationalisms all over the world, propagating 
hatred and ignorance against ‘the others’, particularly against poor, needy, dependents, and 
migrants, including the alleged inferiority of other religions, races, and nations, of women or 
of non-believers, e.g., postulating literal readings of the bible, counting generations back to 
Adam and Eve in the bible’s metaphors, accordingly claiming the world to be some 6000 
years old, or arrogating ‘creationism’ to be seriously taught in schools (on an equal basis with 
scientific evolutionary theory, for the time being), reserving open totalitarianism for the 
future. 
 
The motion of the institutional structure from forms of ceremonial encapsulation to 
instrumentally completely infeasible behaviors (regressive institutional change) may occur 
gradually from (either a past-binding or a future-binding form of) ceremonial encapsulation. 
Again, with regressive institutional change there occurs a further loss of instrumental 
efficiency as (the index of) ceremonial dominance increases and the permissiveness towards 
the application of new knowledge and related instrumental behavior decreases. Knowledge 
and instrumental behavior will be fully displaced in the end by ceremonial behavior under a 
strong dominance of ceremonial values. 
 
(3) Progressive institutional change, on the contrary, will be experienced 
 
‘when for a given fund of knowledge ceremonial patterns of behavior are displaced by 
instrumental patterns of behavior’ (p. 1101). 
 
It would move the institutional structure into the lower left sector of the institutional space 
(see Figure 5 above again), i.e., the ceremonial barriers that have prevented instrumental 
behavior to be realized (because it was ceremonially infeasible) can be torn down on the 
occasion of new technological knowledge. Here we would experience a decreasing (index of) 
ceremonial dominance, which can only come about through a displacement of ceremonial 
values by instrumental values. 
 
Veblen, for instance, had hoped that the forces of the industrial machine process, and the 
working classes related to it, with its requirement of rationality and its cumulative 
instrumental knowledge gained from the ‘tools-skill nexus’, would eventually bring about 
progressive institutional change. He had hoped that cumulative causal chains in industrial 
production would work so that ‘knowledge increases in the degree that it is used’ (as M. 
Lower has put it, cited by Bush, p. 1103). Instrumental valuation and applied and experienced 
instrumental patterns of behavior would then indeed allow for an acceleration of growth in the 
knowledge fund, as has usually been argued in the Veblen-Ayres tradition (see pp. 1102-4). 
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However, the ceremonial encapsulation in the late capitalist culture proved to be stronger so 
far. It has developed, for instance, ceremonial life styles of affluence that prevents rationality 
to be fully realized, with the opulent life style of the developed countries of the Northern 
hemisphere, full of oversupplies of food, drugs, entertainment, diversion, events, and mass 
hysteria, while appropriating and absorbing for this purposes the resources that the rest of the 
globe provides – and even more than these (in fact, the annual ecological footprint of the 
global North is 3 to 4 times their annual natural capacity). 
 
And, in fact, virtually all relevant knowledge on sustainable production, social justice, general 
trust and happiness, on preventing financial speculation and crises, environmental 
deterioration and climate crisis, etc. does already exist, but it cannot be applied because of a 
lack of instrumental collective action capacity, caused by a ceremonial encapsulation of 
knowledge and instrumental behavior. Similarly, we know virtually everything to effectively 
deal with most of the big social and humanitarian problems of societies and of the current 
global structures—but the taboos and belief-systems connected to the dominating ceremonial 
values (‘do not touch the wealth of the mega-rich investors’; ‘do not touch the “market”’; 
‘defend your freedoms of the established ways of production, trade, consumption, mobility, 
leisure, tourism, etc.’, ‘do not restrict freedom and flexibility’, ‘push our national interests 
globally’, ‘protect “our” resources worldwide’, ‘kill the enemy’, etc.) largely prevent an 
instrumental turn in the existing patterns of behavior and valuations. 
 
Furthermore, we know much about many products that could easily be made wear-resistant 
but with this would be profit- and stock-value deteriorating for large oligopolistic 
corporations–and thus are hidden away in corporate safes, or not researched at all. 
 
Regarding a normal-form game perspective, we would argue that while all know about the 
superiority of the collective-action (cooperative) solution and the conditions to get there (a 
game with ‘complete information’), the dominant individualistic (ceremonial) incentive still 
remains to trigger general defection, with an inferior economic performance. In game-
theoretic terms, thus, we would of course consider again the critical role of the payoff 
structure and of the common future (expectations) to explain the ceremonial dominance—i.e., 
their bearing on the degree of problem solving in an economy. 
 
But it has been obvious for institutionalists that progressive institutional change has strong 
limits, in a ceremonially dominated system, particularly in face of an ongoing systemic crisis. 
This system, despite its crises, still has the power to maintain sufficient diversion for its 
people and to keep up its particular myths of modernity, flexibility, liberties, effectiveness, the 
‘systemic relevance’ and usefulness of the super- and mega-rich ‘investors’, also the 
superiority per se of ever more research, ever more high technology, etc. (see also Bush, pp. 
1105-6)—in all, probably a case of ‘future-binding ceremonial encapsulation’ rather than 
progressive institutional change. 
 
We will return to progressive institutional change considering the crucial role for public 
policy to initiate, stabilize, and accelerate it. 
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5) An Additional Explanation on How Ceremonial Dominance May Emerge 
From an Instrumental Benchmark 
 
 
5.1) The Different Benchmarks:  The Institution as 'Enabler' vs. Ceremonial 
Dominance 
 
As we have seen, in the game-theoretic argument, the institution emerges in a complex 
evolutionary process from a defined particular problem-solving process. It helps individuals to 
solve complex decision situations that otherwise would not be solvable in a decentralized 
individualistic economy. 
 
Consistent with this view, it has for long been argued by institutionalists that the institution is 
not just a restriction to some ideal (allegedly unrestrained) perfect maximization, as argued 
by neoclassical economics, and it is not just flatly past-bound, conservative, and inadequate, 
but in complex situations also is an ‘enabler’ of qualified, coordinated behavior of agents 
(see, e.g., Neale 1994), an empowerment of agents in terms of improving information and 
making expectations of agents consistent with each other and thus stabilizing them—the 
instrumental dimension of institutions. 
 
On the other hand, as we have seen, some ceremonial dominance is rooted in the asymmetry 
of the logics of ceremonial vs. instrumental warrants, where ceremonial valuation is more 
‘permeable’, i.e., capable of encapsulating more ways of behavior than instrumental valuation 
is capable of embedding. 
 
This very asymmetry was reflected, as seen, in the dominance of defective strategies in the 
game-theoretic perspective. 
 
Also, in the institutionalist tradition, the ceremonially warranted institution has mostly been 
the starting point, due to the historical perspective of institutionalism, where more or less 
predatory societies and economies have been the received object of realistic and 
comprehensive economic analysis and theorizing. 
 
But this does not ‘genetically’ explain how ceremonial dominance endogenously emerges, 
particularly from a benchmark of an instrumentally warranted institution. Especially in a 
game-theoretic perspective, we would need to show that, and how, initially institutionalized 
problem-solving cooperation degenerates into a ceremonial defection. 
 
Instrumentally warranted institutions can indeed have an endogenous logic of their own, some 
life cycle leading them from ‘instrumental’ (considered here the ‘natural state’ of mankind) to 
‘ceremonial’, in fact a history of degeneration, from problem-solving cooperation to a 
behavior that may formally be unchanged but in fact has become inadequate in face of new 
conditions, equivalent to the idea of (institutional) lock-in as in the famous QWERTY 
analysis (David 1985)—where a new collective-action capability is lacking for proper 
progressive institutional change. 
 
Note that this usually will happen in a hierarchical environment. 
 
For a normal-form game, think of the case mentioned that new conditions (new knowledge, 
some technological/organizational progress, but, in addition, now also an uneven distribution 
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of the gains of cooperative behavior) change the payoff structure in a way to make the former 
(Pareto-) superior common-cooperation solution now (Pareto-) inferior (in a 2x2 PD). We 
will give a schematic illustration after the story-telling. 
 
 
5.2) Degeneration of an Instrumentally Warranted Institution 
 
Instrumentally Warranted Cooperation in a Hierarchical Environment 
The idea applies when, for instance, a fresh economics M.A. or MBA joins a firm with new 
ideas and new knowledge, but his suggestions are refused by his superior arguing ‘We have 
always done it like this, we have been successful with this, and we will continue doing it like 
this.’ This would be a symbolic indication of an institution formerly successfully established 
to solve a certain problem, by which a group became a cooperating one, thus successfully 
coordinated and highly performing. With the successfully cooperating group plus hierarchy, 
however, the group leaders and higher ranks of the cooperating team have established and 
tightened their positions, promoted their careers, and perhaps climbed up the hierarchical 
ladder. 
 
The Career Motive and the Motive of Identity and ‘Belongingness’ 
Differential hierarchical status and power in societies, economies, and organizations that are 
characterized by received power differences and hierarchies anyway, i.e., the ceremonial 
value, thus becomes a new, additional motive determining the future of that institution. But 
also, the very ‘ceremonial’ may provide identity and ‘belongingness’ to the lower ranks of the 
team, which in turn may relieve their uncertainty in the turbulent environment they live in. 
These factors may combine and transform themselves into a situation of unilateral defection 
and exploitation where the superior ones increasingly exploit but manage to keep their 
subordinates cooperating. 
 
Also, pure habituation may explain why those receiving less of the common gain stick to the 
same behavior although the character of the institution has changed. Consider the following 
illustration in a normal-form matrix: 
 
Starting with the usual PD, 
 
a,a  d,b 
   b,d  c,c ,  with b>a>c>d, 
 
the payoffs of common cooperation and success may change into 
 
   a1,a2  d,b 
   b,d  c,c , 
 
with either (1) b>a1>a2>c>d or even (2) a1>b>a2>c>d, i.e., the common success with an 
increasingly uneven distribution. Agent 2, the subordinate, may stick to the institutionalized 
behavior (rather than changing back to defection) by way of receiving identity from the 
‘winning team’ or just by way of habituation, while agent 1, the superior, in the extreme case 
(case (2)), even has a short-run (hyper-rational) incentive to stick to it. 
 
The character of the situation then may further change from an instrumental warrant into a 
full-fledged ceremonial warrant, when (a1,a2) changes into an overtly exploitative situation, 
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(b’,d’), with a further aggravated unequal distribution, when a1→b’ and a2→d’, in the frame 
of a new PD: 
 
   a’,a’  d’,b’ 
         (a1,a2)→(b’,d’)  c’,c’ ,  with a1=b’>a’>c’>a2=d’. 
 
Obviously, with the very success of institutionalized cooperation (with an increase in the 
social knowledge fund), new opportunities of a new common collective action (cooperation) 
have emerged—as has a (latent) new incentive for agent 2 to deviate from his cooperative 
behavior. (In fact, the conventional game-theoretic prediction for the new PD structure would 
be the common-defection NE, since the exploited would rationally switch back to defection as 
well in the new game.) If, however, the system will continue to stick to (b’,d’), the earlier 
instrumentally warranted situation will have fully transformed itself into a ceremonially 
warranted situation, a situation of a Bc-Vc-Bi type.10 
 
Another ‘Motive’:  Institutional Economies of Scale 
A factor supporting this process of cooperative success (how unevenly distributed ever) may 
be transaction cost reduction, i.e., the economies of scale of the application of that institution, 
with a learning curve that ensures that sticking to the institution makes the average 
transaction costs of the single institutionalized decisions ever more decrease—the classical 
case of routinization and, in fact, the cost argument in favor of habituation. 
 
That senior manager who is referring to, and insisting upon, his past experience in the 
example above, thus, is of course not totally wrong. He refers to a history of the institution 
that has been successful. During that history, he and his ‘interaction partners’ have 
successfully established the institution as an adequate instrumental device. 
 
But also, as the game-theoretic analysis makes obvious, he and the others in that interaction 
system in fact had to invest a lot in terms of time, intellectual effort, uncertainty, risk-taking, 
trial & error, non-invidiousness, getting exploited once, etc., to make that institution 
eventually emerging in a long and fragile joint learning process, as indicated. The result was 
the development of an effective instrumentally warranted institution, habituated by all 
involved. 
 
And, as everyone who has invested high fixed costs, he and his fellows desire permanently 
high returns on their investment, by spreading their initial fixed costs over as many 
applications as possible (thus maximizing ‘output’, i.e., the quantity of applications). And, if 
possible, they do not wish to invest in a new learning process. They do want their initial high 
investment to be apportioned among a maximum number of applications of the same 
institution, i.e., an endless series of decisions based on that institution. They want to realize 
what in economic production and cost theory is termed economies of scale (increasing 
returns), i.e., the marginal and average cost of any additional decision under that institution 
thus will be smaller than those of the previous one. The important reason here will be that 
                                                 
10
 There are certainly different ways to capture the ceremonially warranted degenerative situation in some future 
game-theoretic modeling. For instance, one might also think of a game in which each payoff is a vector with the 
elements of an instrumental and ceremonial payoff. A weight function (‘utility function’) may then result in 
overall ceremonially or instrumentally warranted behavior. Habituation and sticking to an earlier instrumentally 
warranted institution under now ceremonial warrant may then be modeled by a change of weights. There are 
many similar approaches in the literature. Proper modeling of instititutionalist theory in this regard must, 
however, be left to future effort. 
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coordination, in a learning process, may become ever more effective (in a stochastic 
population perspective:  the portion of cooperative actions in all actions will increase) and 
thus the whole decision process more effective. 
 
A Norm Still Instrumentally Warranted 
Now, this situation may still be consistent with the instrumental character of the institution. 
While the institution may increasingly appear to the individual agents, in the culture of the 
team, group, or organization at hand, as something external, a given, exogenous requirement, 
desideratum, a postulate, or a norm, it still may be dominantly instrumentally warranted and 
clearly relate to the solution of the problem structure at hand. But tacitly, the motivation to 
maintain the institution may change from solving the original problem to (1) saving the 
careers of the leaders and thus extra benefits and unequal distribution, and (2) reducing 
average transaction costs, making their decision-making as easy and smooth as possible, 
rather than properly solving a defined problem, which may have become a new problem in the 
meantime. 
 
A norm, thus, is not necessarily ceremonially warranted. The instrumentally warranted 
institution may have become a norm, a general prescription that has perhaps even been 
codified, with the connection to the basic problem perhaps having become somewhat opaque, 
but still may be an adequate behavioral pattern. We term this an instrumentally warranted 
norm. 
 
Note that related behavior may easily be considered ‘dialectical’ in the institutionalist 
approach, Bci, as mentioned above. 
 
A Ceremonially Warranted Social Rule and Institution—An Abstract Norm 
Only when some ‘external’ conditions change—in game-theoretic modeling changing 
expectations and/or payoff structure—the instrumentally warranted norm would turn out to be 
disconnected from both the original and the new problem. And it would become further 
disconnected as the establishment of a proper new institution will be blocked by the now 
dominating and obvious motives of differential status and of continuing easy and smooth 
decision-making. The formally same behavior thus now becomes ceremonially warranted, 
and (unilaterally or mutually) defective in terms of the payoff structure, while the agents shift 
from the upper left in our basic PD matrix to the lower left (or upper right, and then perhaps 
even lower left) of a new PD, as illustrated. We call this an abstract norm. Note that the 
‘norm-ative’ dimension primarily will work as an imposition on the subalterns to stick to 
cooperation, the earlier instrumentally warranted institution. 
 
The institutional economies of scale in a complex environment together with the motive of 
differential status and power in any hierarchy thus explain why socio-economic interaction 
systems may stick to an (formerly instrumentally warranted) institution (later degenerating 
into a ceremonially warranted rule for the defecting agent) for longer than instrumentally 
justified. The institution may eventually become outdated because its prerequisites have 
changed, it may become ‘petrified’, ‘sclerotic’, ‘ossified’, outmoded, or locked-in. The 
ceremonial motivation and valuation of power, hierarchy, and status differentials (favoring 
those who came into power with the earlier institution), and of identity, belongingness, 
adherence to symbols, etc. (of the lower ranks) may prevent the interaction system to properly 
learn, and gain a new collective coordination, a renewed collective action capability, and a 
new, adapted institution that would be required according to the instrumental value criterion. 
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Note that we assume that a proper new institution would facilitate even lower average 
decision costs in the long-run. The more disconnected from the problem the abstract norm 
gets, and the more fight over unilateral or mutual exploitation may re-emerge, the more the 
average transaction costs of the old norm may increase again. Thus, in the long-run, the 
potential average transaction costs of a more proper new institution may fall below those of 
the old norm, despite its initial high average and marginal costs. This, of course, does not 
guarantee that the system will regain anew a proper collective action capability, as game-
theoretic analysis makes clear. See Figure 6 for another illustration of the process. 
 
Figure 6: Average Transaction Costs and Institutional Economies of Scale Supporting the 
Emergence of a Ceremonially Warranted Norm After Some ‘Technological’ 
Change--Illustration. 
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In all, this endogenous institutional degeneration may help systematically explain the 
ceremonial dimension and its domination in a hierarchical environment. Figure 7 illustrates 
the dimensions and characters of institutions during a ‘life-cycle’ as described. 
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Figure 7: The Instrumental and Ceremonial Dimensions of Institutions—From an 
Instrumentally Warranted Institution to an Abstract Norm—Illustration. 
 
 
 
 
6) The ‘Discretionary Character of Progressive Institutional Change’ 
and a Game-Theoretically Informed Policy Perspective 
 
 
6.1) The Possibility, and Improbability, of Instrumental Solutions in a Spontaneous 
Decentralized Individualistic System 
 
As progressive institutional change will normally not automatically emerge—particularly 
when systemic crises and conditions of widespread uncertainty and fears may lead to 
enforced ceremonial encapsulation or even regressive institutional change—it remains an 
issue of proper deliberate, discretionary policy action, as institutionalists have always argued 
(see Bush, pp. 1107-9). In the institutionalist tradition, M.R. Tool further developed the 
theory and philosophy of instrumentalism and progressive institutional change into a so-called 
‘social value principle’, which operationalized the pragmatist institutionalist conception of 
public policy and its formation (see, e.g., Tool 1994). It elaborated the issue that democracy 
and democratic participatory policy is substantial in the sense that reasonable decisions on 
prices, wages, income distribution, etc. will have to be determined in transparent cause-and-
effect-based negotiation processes of all social interests involved (the so-called ‘negotiated 
economy’; see, e.g., Commons 1934). This is not primarily about some abstract ‘majority 
rule’ but about the substantial 
 
‘process by which majorities […] are formed’ (Bush, p. 1109), 
 
and such process would be heavily interconnected 
 
‘with the process of inquiry upon which instrumental valuing depends’ (ibid.). 
 
In this way, substantial, participative, and discursive democracy would support collective 
long-run rationality and action capacity, and with this an increasing dominance of 
 
Institutional 
Dimension 
 
 
 
Instrumental 
 
 
Ceremonial 
 
 
 
Normative Load 
 
Problem solving 
 
 
 
 
 
Instrumental 
Institution 
 
 
Keep decision-
making easy and 
smooth; maintain 
hierarchy and 
differential status 
 
Instrumental Norm 
 
 
Don’t care for new problems; follow the 
criterion of career making, differential status, 
and hierarchy, and the prescriptions of those 
in power and high status 
 
 
Abstract Norm 
 
 
 
Examples 
 
Decent car driving; 
investing in climate 
protection; abstaining 
from cheating, 
deception, fraud, 
bribery, ... 
 
 
Some institutions of 
the teaching-
learning situation 
(placement in the 
classroom; 
professor-student 
relation); ... 
 
 
 
Some rules in 
professor-student 
relation; ... 
 
Purely symbolic acts; 
abstract 'eternal laws' of 
society and corresponding 
belief systems; most parts 
of ideology and religion; 
... 
 31 
instrumental values and instrumentally warranted patterns of behavior—i.e., progressive 
institutional change. 
 
The ‘non-cooperative’ game-theoretic perspective, in contrast, is not so much about discourse 
and verbal communication but rather on ‘tacit’ learning from repeated interaction and from 
the consequences of combined action.11 Nevertheless, it suggests a similar conclusion 
regarding the critical role of discretionary public policy action, related to the interaction 
system of the individual agents and the critical factors determining its process and outcomes. 
In fact, game-theoretic modeling and related complex model simulations have specifically 
demonstrated that there is no automatic or easy way out of dominant defection, and even of 
repeated breakdown of some institutionalized cooperation after it has emerged in complex 
settings and long-run evolutionary processes (e.g., Liebrand, Messick 1996; Lindgren 1997). 
 
Thus, a very basic game-theoretically informed policy conclusion, based on the most simple 
single-shot approach as above, may be the following. We refer to Elsner 2001 and make a 
longer story very short here. Remember the simple PD-supergame single-shot inequality 
above. It indicates that if the discount parameter, i.e., the weight of future payoffs or the 
probability ‘to meet again next interaction’, is greater than a certain combination of pay-offs, 
cooperation will pay. Obviously, it is unfavorable for cooperation if (b) and (c) are relatively 
high and (a) and δ are relatively low. The simple algebraic logic of policy action resulting is 
obvious: 
 
δ↑  >  [(b↓ – a↑)↓ / (b↓ – c↓↓)↑]↓. 
 
Note however, that the PD payoff structure must not be dissolved as such, since this would 
imply a trivial and politically costly solution (i.e., subsidizing a such that eventually a>b) (see 
below for more detail). 
 
Thus, the problem that remains and cannot be solved by hyper-rational individuals coined for 
an ideal ‘market’ is the very social-dilemma structure, related to an individualistic ideal 
‘market’ culture—when, however, the real world does not fit this ideal but is characterized by 
directly interdependent and directly interacting agents (see, e.g., Kirman 1998). An 
individualistic culture confronted with permanent complex and dilemma-prone incentive 
structures implies that the process of solving a ‘collective-good’ or a social-dilemma through 
cooperation will usually be highly time-consuming and unstable, if not blocked at all. The 
more individualistic the culture is—or the stronger the dilemma-structure is in terms of the 
relations of a, b, c, d, and δ --, the greater is the incentive to defect or even to deviate from an 
already established institution of cooperation.[In a more elaborated population model on the 
critical size of institutions we have shown that institutions and its carrier groups or platforms 
will become exploited (invaded) by defectors beyond a critical maximum (a ‘meso’) size 
when few invaders profit from exploitation of many cooperators—see Elsner, Heinrich 2009.] 
Again, we can see a full equivalence with the institutionalist conclusions with respect to 
ceremonial dominance here. 
 
The process of (instrumentally warranted) institutional emergence and the conditions for its 
initiation, its sufficiently fast emergence, and its stability over time has been extensively 
                                                 
11
 This means that we will take the policy agent here as given, informed by a deliberately negotiated economy—
admittedly a ‘catch-all’ entity. Modelling such processes with game theory would be in the domain of 
‘cooperative’ game theory. As a prominent example, see, e.g., McCain 2009. 
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investigated in the recent three decades, after some pioneering explorations by, e.g., Schelling 
1978; Schotter 1981; or Axelrod 1984/2006 (among the countless game-theoretic and PD-
based modeling and simulation approaches, see, e.g., Stanley et al. 1994; Liebrand, Messick 
(eds.) 1996; Lindgren 1997; Fudenberg, Levine 1998; Offerman, Sonnemans 1998; Oltra, 
Schenk 1998; Eckert, Koch, Mitloehner 2005; Demange, Wooders (eds.) 2005; Traulsen, 
Novak 2006; Jun, Sethi 2009; Spiekermann 2009; see also, e.g., Field 1994 for another 
institutionalist evaluation of the game-theoretic approach). 
 
For instance, computer simulations of evolutionary processes based on social coordination 
problems have illustrated that disproportionately long times may be necessary to establish 
cooperation as an institution, and that even then cooperation may be fragile and occasionally 
collapse, because of mere small external changes or of internal dynamics. 
 
It is thus necessary to design a supra-individualistic, i.e., broader and more long-run, rational 
mechanism to support this process and complete the system, namely an additional public-
policy intervention to initiate, accelerate, and stabilize the process, which cannot be brought 
forth with sufficient speed and stability by the ‘market’ or any decentralized individualist 
system alone, if there are ubiquitous dilemma-prone direct interdependencies and thus 
coordination/cooperation problems in the real world ‘out there’. 
 
 
6.2) ‘Meritorics’ For a Negotiated Economy 
 
The conception of the merit good (see, e.g., Brennan, Lomasky 1983; Musgrave 1987) has 
substantiated ‘meritorization’ (i.e., a positive social valuation) exactly on the basis of 
‘community preferences’ that have evolved from interaction processes beyond the ‘market’ 
logic (Musgrave 1987, 452). This implies a social evaluation of the outcomes of the ‘market’ 
through some kind of a social decision-making broader than, relatively independent of, and 
superior to it. 
 
For our purpose we will define a merit good as a good possibly resulting from the 
decentralized evolutionary interaction process of emergence as indicated (in this sense a 
‘private good’), which, however, needs to be evaluated through a social decision-making 
process on the grounds of its deficient quantity, quality, and—as new dimensions discovered 
in deficient ‘market’ processes with coordination and cooperation problems—the time needed 
for its production as well as the certainty and stability of acquiring it through a decentralized 
process (see also, e.g., Ver Eecke 1998). 
 
Institutionalists have always claimed that democratic and participative socio-political 
decision-making should continue to be relatively independent of the ‘market’ allocation and 
should have priority over it (see, e.g., Hayden 1994). The institutionalist conception of the 
negotiated economy was exactly elaborated to show that the ‘market’ has to be deliberately 
embedded in a wider socio-political process, and how this is possible (see again Commons 
1934, 612ff., 649ff.; also, e.g., Ramstad 1991; Nielsen 1992). 
 
We will not delve into this discussion any deeper here, but will simply assume an economic 
policy agent who is legitimized through a process of participatory democratic decision-
making, subject to the criteria of the pragmatist ‘instrumental value principle’. In this very 
process, public policy objectives can be developed which provide the criteria for the 
‘meritorization’ required. 
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Against this background, the economic policy agent may employ instruments related to the 
interactive process of the private agents to change those interactions, aiming at initiating, 
accelerating, and stabilizing the provision of the merit good through promoting cooperation.  
 
 
6.3) Instruments of an ‘Interactive’ or ‘Institutional’ Economic Policy 
 
Not only does the public policy agent have to publicly identify the specific characteristics of 
the ‘good’ he wants the private agents to cooperatively produce (basically the ‘Pareto-
superior’ economic situation as illustrated), i.e., the public objective or ‘merit good’, but he 
must also establish incentives to promote cooperative private behavior that favors this 
superior social solution. For instance, he may involve the private agents into projects to be 
pursued cooperatively, which helps (1) increasing their awareness of their complex and 
dilemma-prone interdependence (for this, see, e.g., Bush 1999), (2) enabling them to learn to 
cooperate, and (3) increasing their awareness of the fact that they always will have a common 
future to meet again (a high δ) (and then either reward each other for previous cooperation or 
continue sanctioning and ‘warfare’ for earlier defection). 
 
Rewarding Cooperation 
The first complex of instruments of interactive economic policy is rather obvious; it aims at 
changing the incentives (the payoffs in the technical sense) in order to increase the relative 
rewards for cooperation (a↑) or the opportunity costs of common defection (b↓ - c↓↓)↑, or 
decrease the opportunity costs of common cooperation (b↓ - a↑)↓. See the simple logic of 
policy actions attached to the single-shot inequality above. 
 
The single-shot inequality also shows that the more successful the public agent is in 
integrating the private agents into a future-bound process—i.e., the higher the discount 
parameter δ is--, the less the increase of the relative rewards for cooperation need to be. 
 
However, this trade-off between the rewards for cooperation (a) and the ‘shadow of the 
common future’ (Axelrod) (δ) does not imply a contrast between quantitative (namely, 
pecuniary) and qualitative instruments, i.e., offering pecuniary subsidies as opposed to 
promoting more favorable expectations among the agents (of ‘meeting again’). As has been 
shown from long lasting practical experience, the incentives from the public policy agent 
which reward cooperation may even primarily consist of non-pecuniary benefits (see again 
Elsner 2001). 
 
Enlarging the ‘Shadow of the Future’ 
The second complex of instruments of interactive economic policy is not so obvious. It refers 
to the analytics of the basic interactive process, i.e., the logic and probability of ‘meeting 
again’ (the same agent in a future interaction)12. Consistent with the single-shot solution, 
cooperation can be promoted if the discount parameter can be increased, i.e., if future 
interactions become more probable or future-awareness of the agents can be promoted. 
 
Although it is not so obvious, this characteristic condition for the success of the basic 
evolutionary process can also be subject to policy control. As Axelrod (1984/2006) has 
already mentioned, the public agent can indeed increase the importance (i.e., the probability, 
                                                 
12
 Note that the introduction of reputation mechanisms and chains in more complex population models helps 
considerably extending the number and range of agents falling under this criterion. 
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or weight) of future interactions with the same by organizing cooperation in the form of 
frequent project-based meetings, or make it permanent, e.g., by organizing meetings with a 
greater frequency, dividing projects into several sub-interactions, connecting different 
projects so that the same agents will meet in different arenas, connecting them over time, etc. 
Obviously, there is ample opportunity for the public agent to deliberately design the 
conditions of interaction to promote cooperation in a variety of subject areas that private 
agents are jointly interested in, namely, in order to improve the common conditions (location 
factors) of their individual economic activities (infrastructures, intermediary agencies, and 
even improving the industrial structure itself by strengthening all individual agents involved). 
 
This policy perspective can be, and has been, applied to manifold areas of industrial and 
regional policies, cluster and network policies, innovation and information policies (see, e.g., 
Elsner 2000, 2001). Also, it has been demonstrated to be a ‘lean’, ‘qualitative’, ‘structural’, 
and thus inexpensive policy (it definitely is not about subsidizing cooperation so that a > b). 
 
It is institutional policy since it refers to the processes of institutional emergence, and it is 
‘double interactive’ as it refers in an interactive way to the conditions and intermediate results 
of the interaction processes of the private agents. 
Finally, it has been shown to be applicable by ‘enlightened’ interdependent and interacting 
agents themselves, as their own policy strategy, e.g., in their cluster, their value-added chain, 
their innovation network, etc., or by an ‘enlightened’ neutral private cluster or network 
advisor hired by the agents. As far as this has its inherent limits, the public agent’s state 
activity, a new type of ‘enlightened’ public agency, to be sure, is required. 
 
The evolutionary-institutionalist interpretation of the game-theoretic perspective obviously 
largely and ‘naturally’ converges with the policy perspectives institutionalism has developed 
over decades. 
 
 
 
7) A Short Conclusion 
 
 
In this paper, an effort was made to 
 
- revisit the institutionalist theory of institutional change as formulated by P.D. 
Bush, after (roughly) 25 years; 
 
- reconsider the logic of its conception of institutions and institutional value-
behavior-structures; 
 
- elaborate surprising equivalences, similarities and complementarities of a game-
theoretic perspective, if embedded in a proper evolutionary perspective and 
‘process story’, with the institutionalist approach, as demonstrated in the cases of 
(1) the conception of institutions, (2) value-warranted institutional structures, (3) 
the basic asymmetry between instrumental and ceremonial warrant, (4) the 
concept of ceremonial dominance, and (5) the different resulting forms of value-
behavior-structures and their potential endogenous dynamics, i.e. institutional 
change; 
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- elaborate some relative advantages and disadvantages of each perspective, as for 
instance 
 
(1) the advantage of the institutionalist approach towards the specification of the 
different value-behavior structures, based on a clear conception of the 
instrumental-vs.-ceremonial asymmetry, of the dynamics of ceremonial 
encapsulation, and of progressive and regressive institutional change; 
 
(2) the clearer distinction in the game-theoretic perspective between institutions 
and simpler social rules (with the same asymmetry, though), based on its greater 
potential of a logical analysis of the processes of institutional emergence, 
furthermore its logical requirement to endogenously explain the emergence and 
dominance of the ceremonial warrant as instrumentally warranted institutions 
changing into ‘abstract norms’; 
 
- parallel the inescapable ‘discretionary’ policy perspectives in both approaches, 
where already the most simple formal solution shows that a proper game-
theoretical argument can contribute some specific implications for policy 
instruments, which, however, may well fit into the broader institutionalist 
conceptions of the social value principle and the negotiated economy. 
 
In all, a modern revisiting, interpretation, and enrichment of the 25-years old state of the art of 
the institutionalist theory of institutional change is possible—with, in all, more 
complementarities and synergies rather than incommensurabilities and paradigmatic 
differences. 
 
It appears that such a review bears some potential, and the institutionalist conceptions of 
institutions, evolution, and change may profit from insights based on proper use of game 
theory—but also, and perhaps even more so, evolutionary-institutional game-theory may 
considerably be informed from encountering the rich tradition of evolutionary 
institutionalism. 
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